For most modern readers of Plato the very idea of Forms of individuals would appear as being contradictory and incomprehensible. A Platonic Form is normally thought of as something represented by a term such as ÒLargenessÓ or ÒJusticeÓ or, perhaps, ÒFireÓ or ÒTreeÓ, and supposed to be in some way responsible for the presence of the corresponding general properties of being ÒlargeÓ or ÒjustÓ, Òa reÓ or Òa treeÓ in individual objects. It is considered as a basic aspect of both its ontological and its epistemological function that it provides a unitary and stable point of reference for all the various uses of these general terms and, therefore, a guarantee for their unambiguousness. Plato himself stresses this connection between Forms and generality while formulating his famous ÒruleÓ for introducing them:
We have been in the habit, if you remember, of positing a Form whenever we use the same name in many instances, one Form for each ÒmanyÓ.
(Rep. 596a, tr. A.D. Lindsay)
Aristotle, when reviewing this ÒruleÓ in his Metaphysics, explicitly connects the Platonic Forms with his own universals (kayñlou), obviously regarding generality as their most prominent characteristic:
Socrates did not make the universals or de nitions exist apart; his successors, however (sc. Plato), gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas. When we turn to AristotleÕs own philosophy though, his exact position concerning the existence of forms of individuals becomes much more difcult to ascertain. According to the standard view, for him a form is what brings together individuals under a single species, while matter is what makes them different instances of this species, acting as a principle of individuation.
4 However, the truth is that in certain passages he seems to envisage, at least in some cases, forms of individual substances, 5 while in others he is thought to imply their existence, 6 and in recent years a whole school of interpretation has developed, according to which forms of individuals or particulars constitute the basis for the ontology lurking between the lines of Metaphysics Z.
7 I do not think that this is the right place to examine this vexed question in detail. All I need to establish is that a plausible case can be made for maintaining that Aristotle had seriously considered forms of individuals as a possible solution for the central problem of his metaphysics: Which is the primary essence that underlies the various properties and the alterations of an object, and makes
